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When two or more legal systems occupy the same social space, individuals 
often find themselves at the intersection of a plurality of normative regimes among 
which they may be able to choose to regulate a given relationship or situation. If the 
interaction between the legal systems is formally organized in a way that recognizes 
a substantial degree of legal pluralism, the right of individuals to decide to which 
law they wish to submit—the law of sub-state groups or state law—may be 
recognized and, as a consequence, enforceable by competent state institutions. 
Individual choice, however, may occur even when it is not validated by the 
official law. For example, indigenous customary adoptions are still officially ignored 
in eight of the ten Canadian provinces.1 Yet it has been found that a substantial 
 
* Ph.D., FRSC, Professor of Law, Canada Research Chair on Legal Diversity and Indigenous Peoples, 
University of Ottawa. This research was undertaken, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada 
Research Chairs Program. The author also wishes to thank the UC Irvine Law Review and Professor 
Janine Ubink for inviting him to a most stimulating symposium on legal pluralism held at UCI on 
August 26, 2017. This paper is a revised version of the draft presented at the symposium. 
1. See Cindy L. Baldassi, The Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across Canada: 
Comparisons, Contrasts, and Convergences, 39 U.B.C.L. REV. 63 (2006). For a collection of essays on 
customary adoption, see L’ADOPTION COUTUMIÈRE ET LES DÉFIS DU PLURALISME JURIDIQUE 
(Ghislain Otis ed., 2013). 
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proportion of the Inuit of Nunavik2 apply customary law today when they adopt a 
child or decide to have their child adopted.3 It seems fair to suggest that, given the 
intense exposure of the Inuit to state institutions and mainstream education in 
recent decades,4 at least some Inuit are aware of the fact that state law regulates 
adoptions but nonetheless decide to uphold their traditional laws.5 
Conversely, the fact that state law formally allows individual choice does not 
mean that it is always a realistic prospect in actual practice. By removing the 
possibility of coercion, the law creates a space of freedom, which is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the exercise of personal autonomy. For some 
individuals, the right to choose might be merely theoretical, due to a lack of adequate 
information, deeply entrenched power imbalances within a normative community,6 
or the perceived high cost—cultural, social, emotional, or economic—of setting 
aside the norms of their group.7 It has been argued that in the case of particularly 
vulnerable members of sub-state groups, such as women and children, choice might 
even be unthinkable.8 However, the effective capacity of individuals to avail 
themselves of a formal freedom to choose can neither be confirmed nor ruled out 
in the abstract, as it is contingent upon a range of social, economic, cultural, and 
personal variables that cannot be generalized. 
It may also depend on the legal impact the choice has on an individual’s 
connection to the group. Abandoning altogether one’s legally-recognized status as 
a member of an ethno-cultural or religious community is not the same as merely 
opting out of some specific community norms under certain circumstances. In 
others words, choice of personal legal status should not be confused with choice of 
 
2. Nunavik is the name given to the Arctic region of Quebec that is the traditional homeland 
of the Nunavik Inuit. 
3. See Mylène Larivière, Le Régime Coutumier de L’Adoption des Enfants Autochtones: L’Exemple 
du Droit des Inuits du Nunavik, in L’ADOPTION COUTUMIÈRE ET LES DÉFIS DU PLURALISME 
JURIDIQUE, supra note 1, at 7, 10. 
4. In 1975, the Inuit of Nunavik, Canada and Quebec signed the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement, known in Canada as the first modern treaty. The Agreement ushered in a new era of 
interaction between the Inuit and non-Inuit institutions. A group of Nunavik Inuit organizations 
recently carried out extensive consultations, which revealed significant societal transformations among 
the Inuit that have resulted from the intensification of interactions with southern culture and 
institutions. See MAKIVIK CORP. ET AL., PARNASIMAUTIK CONSULTATION REPORT (2014). 
5. The Parnasimautik report confirms that customary adoption remains a central and vibrant 
institution within Nunavik Inuit society. Id. at 50–51. The Quebec Civil Code now recognizes 
indigenous customary adoption. See An Act to Amend the Civil Code and Other Legislative Provisions 
as Regards Adoption and the Disclosure of Information, S.Q. 2017, c 12, arts 1–13 (Can.). 
6. For example, because of enduring power imbalances and patriarchal forces, various choice 
models in some African countries have not, on the whole, effectively enabled women freely to move 
away from customary norms regarding marriage and access to land. See Tracy E. Higgins & Jeanmarie 
Fenrich, Customary Law, Gender Equality, and the Family: The Promise and Limits of a Choice Paradigm, 
in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 423 ( Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011). 
7. For an excellent discussion of the obstacles to choice, see BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND 
EQUALITY 150–51 (2001). 
8. Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic 
Rights to Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 222 (2002). 
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personal law. Choosing one personal legal status over another is determinative of 
legal identity. It also amounts to waiving all the rights, privileges, and advantages 
that the law attaches to the identity that is relinquished. For example, in Canada, if 
a person renounces his or her status as a member of an indigenous people under a 
treaty, he or she will no longer be able to claim any of the rights or benefits flowing 
from such status pursuant to the treaty.9 Choice of law has less disruptive effects, 
as it applies only to a discrete situation or relationship and thus does not otherwise 
modify an individual’s legal tie to the group.10 For these reasons, there may be fewer 
obstacles to choice of personal law than to choice of personal status. 
This paper examines choice of law by indigenous people in Canada where 
indigenous law and state law have long coexisted and interacted without any formal 
system of coordination due to the state’s general indifference and even hostility 
toward indigenous law.11 As a result, choice of law by indigenous individuals had 
until recently been mainly unofficial,12 and its consequences had attracted little 
interest. Developments have taken place, however, particularly since 1982, when 
the aboriginal and treaty rights of the indigenous peoples of Canada were 
constitutionally recognized and affirmed in Article 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.13 Because these rights are group rights, the role played by indigenous legal 
systems in the communal regulation of their exercise is now acknowledged.14 In 
addition, several modern self-government agreements and treaties have been signed 
and many more are being negotiated by indigenous nations and governments.15 
New indigenous law-making institutions have been put in place pursuant to these 
treaties,16 thus adding a fresh layer of complexity to Canadian state legal pluralism. 
In this context, examining the issue of individual choice of law has become an 
 
9. For example, modern treaties grant specific rights only to individuals who are enrolled as 
indigenous persons connected to an indigenous people party to the treaty. The conditions for individual 
enrolment are specified in the treaties which explicitly allow for an individual’s voluntary withdrawal 
from the enrolment register. See, e.g., Nisga’a Final Agreement, B.C.-Can.-Nisga’a, chapter 20, section 
17, May 27, 1998, S.C. 200, ch. 7 (entered into force May 11, 2000). 
10. See Sebastien Grammond, The Reception of Indigenous Legal Systems in Canada,  
in MULTIJURALISM: MANIFESTATIONS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 45, 50–51 (Albert Breton et  
al. eds., 2009). 
11. For an account of the limited formal recognition of indigenous customary law in Canada 
since the nineteenth century, see Grammond, supra note 10. 
12. See id. 
13. Paragraph 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that: “The existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” For a general 
commentary of the law of aboriginal and treaty rights, see SEBASTIEN GRAMMOND, TERMS OF 
COEXISTENCE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND CANADIAN LAW 203–50 (2013). 
14. Ghislain Otis, The Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights: A New 
Framework for Managing Legal Pluralism in Canada?, 46 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 320, 
327–28 (2014). 
15. For figures and statistics on modern treaties signed and currently being negotiated, see 
Comprehensive Claims, INDIGENOUS AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030577/1100100030578 [ https://perma.cc/U6DP-X9NU] (last updated 
July 13, 2015). 
16. See id. 
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important task in understanding state legal pluralism with respect to indigenous 
peoples in Canada. 
As Section 1 of this paper explains, when colonial powers could not simply 
ignore indigenous law, they favoured individual choice, which they viewed as a 
means of achieving the hegemony of Western law through the gradual erosion of 
non-Western law.  
While the colonial logic of Western legal hegemony has lost much of its 
legitimacy today, Section 2 shows that individual choice of personal status and 
personal law still has enthusiastic supporters among liberal political theorists and 
legal scholars. These supporters link the individual freedom to choose and the 
effective protection of individual autonomy and human rights because it permits 
individuals to opt for state law wherever non-state law perpetuates rules and 
practices regarded as oppressive or discriminatory. 
Section 3 of the paper ascertains the extent to which individual choice is 
recognized in the area of indigenous governance in Canada, and critically examines 
the strength of the human rights argument in favour of choice in the context of 
modern self-government treaties. Finally, this Section argues that there is no strong 
case in favor of individual choice as a means of self-protection from human rights 
violations in the context of modern treaties. 
I. CHOICE OF LAW AS A DIFFUSIONIST COLONIAL TOOL 
The need to reflect on the role of individual autonomy in the context of a 
plurality of personal laws seems to be as old as legal pluralism itself. 
It is said that the Romans17 and later the Ottoman Empire18 recognized choice 
of personal law. The approach allowed Barbarians or certain religious minorities in 
the Empire to continue applying their laws or customs while also giving them access 
to the dominant law as they wished.19 Starting in the eighteenth century, choice of 
law was used broadly by European colonial powers in their colonized territories 
where Western legal traditions and non-Western legal universes met. It was part of 
British practice in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,20 Dutch colonial law as applied 
 
17. NORBERT ROULAND, STEPHANE PIERRE-CAPS & JACQUES POUMAREDE, DROIT DES 
MINORITIES ET DES PEUPLES AUTOCHTONES 54–55 (1996). 
18. Non-Muslims could choose between their religious community’s personal law and Muslim 
law, but choice of law was denied to Muslims. See PIERRE GANNAGE, LE PLURALISME DES STATUTS 
PERSONNELS DANS LES ÉTATS MULTICOMMUNAUTAIRES 350–52 (2001). 
19. See ROULAND ET AL., supra note 17, at 55. 
20. For Asia, see DAVID PEARL, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT OF LAW IN INDIA, PAKISTAN 
AND BANGLADESH 28–34 (1981). For sub-Saharan Africa, see Anthony A. Allott, What Is to Be Done 
with African Customary Law?: The Experience of Problems and Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950, 
28 J. AFR. L. 56, 61–63 (1984). For the Middle East, see Norman Bentwich, The Application of Jewish 
Law in Palestine, 9 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 59 (1927). 
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in the Indonesian archipelago,21 and French colonial law in Africa.22 It was designed 
to authorize the colonized to temporarily preserve their indigenous legal systems in 
certain areas of private law—in particular the law of persons and family law—while 
encouraging them to submit to the law of the colonizer.23 
Choice of law can still be observed to this day, to varying degrees and in 
various forms, in at least one overseas French territory24 and the multi-community 
states of the Middle East that practice the personality of laws on the basis of 
religion.25 It also exists in several postcolonial African states where, in matters 
involving personal law, African populations may still choose between their 
customary or religious laws and the Western-inspired law of the state.26 In  
some situations where several non-state legal orders exist in a territory with a  
multi-community population, individuals subject to these diverse personal laws may 
choose between them to govern their relationships with members of the other 
communities.27 This is sometimes the case in Africa.28 In such cases, choice of law 
can be characterized as “horizontal” in its relationship with non-state laws, as 
opposed to situations where the general law of the state and non-state laws govern 
their own respective areas (the “vertical” option). 
Choice of law has generally been conceived as a tool to propagate the law of 
the colonial or imperial power and eventually secure its hegemony. Colonial 
doctrine in fact saw this option as a gentler, more realistic means of legally 
acculturating non-Western peoples than the brutal and largely ineffective 
transplantation of modern law.29 Solus, a specialist in colonial French private law, 
associated choice of law with what he called the “sociological law of imitation.”30  
… the Indigenous person will slowly become familiar with metropolitan 
institutions; he will understand the economy; he will appreciate the 
commodities and advantages. … It will therefore not be surprising to 
observe him resort to the same proceedings and the same institutions when 
 
21. See Amry Vandenbosch, Customary Law in the Dutch East Indies, 14 J. COMP. LEGIS. & 
INT’L L. 30, 42–43 (1932). 
22. On French colonial law, see HENRY SOLUS, TRAITE DE LA CONDITION DES INDIGENES 
EN DROIT PRIVE 286–93 (1927); LOUIS-AUGUSTIN BARRIERE, LE STATUT PERSONNEL DES 
MUSULMANS D’ALGERIE DE 1834 A 1962 139–55 (1993). 
23. See Vandenbosch, supra note 21, at 42–43; SOLUS, supra note 22, at 431; GANNAGÉ, supra 
note 18, at 105. 
24. This has been the case in Mayotte since 2003. See LAURENT SERMET, UNE 
ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 76–77 (2009). 
25. GANNAGÉ, supra note 18, at 347–54. It must be remembered that choice is not allowed for 
Muslims. 
26. S. AFR. LAW COMM’N, THE HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE 
INDIGENOUS LAW: REPORT ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 14–20 (1999). See also Higgins & Fenrich, 
supra note 6; Chuma Himonga, State and Individual Perspectives of a Mixed Legal System in Southern 
African Contexts with Special Reference to Personal Law, 25 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 24, 30–33 (2010). 
27. See S. AFR. LAW COMM’N, supra note 26, at 19. 
28. Id. at 85–89. 
29. GANNAGÉ, supra note 18, at 349. 
30. SOLUS, supra note 22, at 424. 
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he later comes in contact with another Indigenous person and a European 
intervenes in the operation. Would he not in fact be encouraged to do so 
by the right to choose the law which is recognized by the colonial legislator, 
a right to choose which allows Indigenous persons to contract under 
French law? 31 
Thus, choice of law was an institution that legal variation theorists would 
characterize as “diffusionist.”32 Drawing inspiration from the work of linguists, 
observers of the circulation of legal models have established a typology of the 
processes leading to the movement from one legal system to another. This typology 
comprises two fundamental categories: variation by evolution and variation by 
diffusion.33 The means of diffusion of legal models are most often imitation, 
expansion, and transmission or teaching.34 In a colonial or imperial context, choice 
of law combines the logic of expansion with that of imitation, encouraging 
individuals to behave in a manner likely to reproduce the dominant legal model by 
transposing this model into their legal lives. 
It is thus part of a plan to cause non-state law and the institutions from which 
it originates to atrophy, due to unequal competition that favours state law because 
the dominant political and legal institutions are concerned with minimizing their 
share of risk in the competition between legal systems. They achieve that by 
channelling individual choices to their benefit. Thus, choice of law is invariably 
asymmetrical; in other words, individuals living under their specific personal  
non-Western laws can move toward the general law, while individuals governed by 
the general law cannot opt for non-state law reserved for members of recognized 
ethno-cultural or religious groups.35 In the absence of a reciprocal freedom to 
choose, only the sub-state legal order risks losing the choice game, while the official 
law, being actively promoted, is the only legal system likely to recruit new 
“adherents.” 
Asymmetrical choice does not appear to be fair when the relationship between 
legal systems is considered as purely “competitive” and in terms of the “marketplace 
of laws” within which systems are committed to maximizing their capital of 
adherents to the detriment of their competitors.36 On the other hand, certain non-
Western legal traditions, in particular those of indigenous or tribal peoples, are 
relatively free of the claim to universality that drives the expansionism of more 
hegemonic traditions.37 In other words, for such non-Western legal traditions, 
 
31. Id. at 431. 
32. RODOLFO SACCO, ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE, APPORT À UNE MACRO-HISTOIRE DU 
DROIT 39–40 (2008). 
33. Id. at 37–40. 
34. Id. at 39–40. 
35. See GANNAGÉ, supra note 18, at 104–05. 
36. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS IN THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY 
IN LAW 92 (5th ed. 2014). 
37. Glenn has pointed out that “chthonic” legal traditions do not tend to be expansionist. See 
id. at 94. 
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competition with state law means quelling the disaffection of “natural” adherents 
more than converting individuals who are strangers to the group. 
Despite the scarcity of empirical studies on the actual contribution of choice 
of law to the erosion of non-Western legal institutions, some jurists give credence 
to the diffusionist hypothesis. Allott, for example, notes the effect of individual 
choice on customary African law, and finds that: 
Of all the solvents of customary law, the power to make contracts is surely 
the most powerful. Law follows events as much as it controls them…. The 
accumulated result of a million individual decisions to avail oneself of the 
possibilities of the law of contract, by entering novel transactions and 
relationship of a non-customary kind is to shift the law in that area from 
customary to non-customary.38 
Certain precedents, however, suggest that when non-state law is a highly 
structured, revealed religious law such as Muslim law, the expansionist effect of the 
right to choose Western law is less evident.39 In the case of Algeria, for example, 
one author has said that choice of law ran up against “the stubborn resistance of a 
population to assimilation of any sort, a veritable implementation of the 
immutability of Muslim law and its intransigence in the face of secularization of any 
kind.”40 
The colonial approach to diffusionism as a rationale for individual choice of 
law, which is motivated by the notion that Western law should naturally become 
universal, has lost much of its ascendancy now that cultural and legal diversity are 
increasingly acknowledged as social goods worthy of protection even in so-called 
liberal states.41 Where specific groups or nations such as indigenous peoples are 
concerned, strongly institutionalized promotion of the state’s Western legal system 
also appears to be at odds with the international affirmation of their right to  
self-determination and self-government, which favours the preservation and 
development of distinctive indigenous legal systems.42 
 
38. Allott, supra note 20, at 62. 
39. Research on French Algeria has shown the failure of the choice technique as a means of 
expanding the application of the Civil Code among the Muslim population. See BARRIÈRE, supra note 
22, at 221. 
40. François-Paul Blanc, Preface to BARRIÈRE, supra note 22, at ii. 
41. Liberal theorists generally agree that sub-state ethno-cultural and religious groups should 
enjoy some measure of recognition but vigorously debate the extent of such recognition. For a useful 
discussion of some prominent schools of thought among liberal pluralists, see George Crowder, Two 
Concepts of Liberal Pluralism, 35 POL. THEORY 121, 121–26 (2007). 
42. Article 34 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and 
their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, 
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.” G.A. Res. 61/
295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at art. 34 (Sept. 13, 2007). Likewise, article XXII 
of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in 
the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international 
human rights standards. 2. The indigenous law and legal systems shall be recognized and 
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II. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 
In the postcolonial period, individual choice has found new advocates: the 
promoters of human rights in legally plural or multicultural societies. Indeed, of all 
of the issues related to choice of personal legal status and law, the protection of 
human rights and freedoms is perhaps the most significant in current political, 
philosophical, and legal debates. 
The individual right to “leave” one’s group of belonging is often advocated as 
a sine qua non of freedom and equality for members subject to the normative powers 
of sub-state ethno-cultural or religious groups. French essayist Pascal Bruckner 
provides a classic formulation of this liberal defense of the so-called right to exit: 
The protection of minority rights is also the right of all individuals 
belonging to these minorities to withdraw from these groups without 
damage as a result of indifference to or detachment from clan or family 
solidarities and to forge their own destinies, without inhabiting the roles 
inherited from their parents. Thus, it is the right to exist as private persons, 
to become different persons whose lives have the meaning they choose, 
not one they have inherited from their roots.43 
In legal terms, the right to exit includes the freedom to abandon one’s personal 
legal status as a member of a formally recognized sub-state group, thereby opting 
for the legal status enjoyed by all citizens. Choice of legal status is also seen as 
necessary to safeguard the human rights of the most vulnerable individuals—
women and children, for example—who are considered to be the most likely victims 
of “illiberal” community practices.44 Exit, however, may not be a viable option or it 
may not be desired even by oppressed members of the group.45 As one author puts 
it, “Rights of exit provide no help to women or members of other oppressed groups 
who are deeply attached to their culture but not to their oppressive aspects.”46 
In such cases, choice of law is advocated as one of the alternatives to the 
“either/or” logic of exit.47 It can be seen as a compromise between leaving the 
community and the total captivity of individuals within the legal order of their 
 
respected by the national, regional and international-legal systems. 
Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at art. XXII, 
OEA/Ser.P, AG/doc.5537/16 ( June 8, 2016). 
43. PASCAL BRUCKNER, THE TYRANNY OF GUILT: AN ESSAY ON WESTERN MASOCHISM 
148–49 (Grasset & Fasquelle eds., Steven Rendall trans., 2012). 
44. There is a vast amount of literature on choice and the protection of the rights of women or 
minorities within religious groups. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001); Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL 
THEORY 165 (1998); Dwight G. Newman, Exit, Voice and ‘Exile’: Rights to Exit and Rights to Eject, 
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 43 (2007); Okin, supra note 8; Oonagh Reitman, On Exit, in MINORITIES WITHIN 
MINORITIES: EQUALITY RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 189 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 
2005). 
45. Okin, supra note 8. 
46. Id. at 226–27. 
47. See SHACHAR, supra note 44, at 143. 
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group. Individuals are not compelled to make the often impracticable decision of 
totally cutting legal ties with the community, but may instead protect themselves in 
given situations by avoiding the application of a personal law that infringes their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This is the position defended by Ayelet Schachar, 
for example, who proposes a system of options, while also subscribing to a limited 
liberal version of the diffusionist model whereby the competition of laws for the 
adherence of individuals encourages the sub-state group to spontaneously align its 
normative practices and treatment of its members with the state model of individual 
rights and freedoms.48 
Legal scholars and institutions that have studied the issue of individual choice 
in countries that apply the personality of laws have often done so from the 
perspective of the protection of human rights. For example, the South African Law 
Commission has recommended that the regime of personal African custom co-exist 
with the right to choose on the grounds that “individuals are free to participate in a 
culture of choice.”49 Likewise, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination has urged Namibia to establish a choice of law regime to 
allow Namibian women to marry and divorce under the general state law if they so 
wish, to counter the application of customs held to be oppressive and discriminatory 
on the basis of gender.50 In Lebanon, liberal jurists have long invoked individual 
rights and freedom of conscience to demand the right for Lebanese people to 
choose freely between religious law and the general state law, particularly in matters 
of marriage and divorce.51 
In Canada, a heated debate flared up about choice of law and human rights 
when a government-appointed commissioner proposed confirming and regulating 
the right of couples in the province of Ontario to submit their family disputes to 
religious arbitration tribunals applying personal religious laws insofar as they were 
compatible with Ontario law.52 It was specifically recommended that couples 
 
48. See id. For a discussion of choice of law as a possible means of reconciling a dual 
commitment to legal pluralism and gender equality, see Higgins & Fenrich, supra note 6. 
49. S. AFR. LAW COMM’N, supra note 26, at 29. 
50. The Committee “invites the State party to consider introducing a system which allows 
individuals a choice between customary law systems and the national law.” Comm. on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/NAM/CO/12, at ¶ 11 (2008). 
51. Léna Gannagé, Religion et Droits Fondamentaux dans le Droit Libanais de la Famille, in 
DROIT ET RELIGION 517, 525–27 (Centre d’Études des Droits du Monde Arabe ed., 2003); Jean Salem, 
Un Ordonnancement Constitutionnel sous Hypothèque: Religion et Constitutionnalisme au Liban, in DROIT 
ET RELIGION 469, 479–80 (Centre d’Études des Droits du Monde Arabe ed., 2003). 
52. Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion, 
MINISTRY ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 2004), https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/ 
pubs/boyd/executivesummary.html [ https://perma.cc/W43S-3PJ6] (last visited May 25, 2018). For 
critical discussions of this controversy, see Faisal Bhabha, Between Exclusion and Assimilation: 
Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 54 MCGILL L.J. 45, 72–83 (2009), and Natasha Bakht, Were Muslim 
Barbarians Really Knocking on the Gates of Ontario?: The Religious Arbitration Controversy–Another 
Perspective, 2006 OTTAWA L. REV. (40th Anniversary Ed.) 67. 
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should, subject to legal safeguards, have the right to choose between state law and 
religious law for the purpose of the arbitration of family disputes.53 The government 
of Ontario rejected the idea of religious arbitration boards, and the Ontario 
legislature enacted a statute explicitly prohibiting the religious arbitration of family 
disputes in the province.54 
So far, however, very little attention has been paid to choice of law by 
indigenous people, let alone its human rights implications and justification. 
Focusing primarily on modern self-government treaties, the next Section examines 
the extent to which indigenous choice of law is part of state legal pluralism in 
Canada, and assesses the validity of the human rights justification for individual 
choice in the context of modern treaties. 
III. INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE, CHOICE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CANADA 
In Canada, the competition between indigenous legal orders and Western law 
has existed since contact. Thus, the prospect of choice, whether officially 
sanctioned or not, has long been part of the lives of indigenous individuals. Until 
recently, formal regimes of choice of law have been rare in Canada, a country that 
is distinguished by the fact that, aside from a few circumscribed validations of 
customary law, its colonial law has not recognized or institutionalized an extensive 
system of indigenous personal law.55 Unlike what has happened in Africa, Asia, and 
the Pacific, British and Canadian authorities did not see the need to establish an 
official dual legal regime, which would have required a consideration of the 
appropriateness of establishing a formal and detailed choice of law regime. This can 
most probably be explained by the fact that the indigenous peoples quickly found 
themselves in the minority due to massive and relentless colonization by non-
indigenous settlers.56 The result was that, despite the fact that the constitution 
eventually made it possible to apply personal laws for “Indians,”57 the State has not 
made any decisive commitment toward indigenous personal law. 
Nevertheless, very well-known examples of tacit choice of law mechanisms 
exist. For example, the case law and legislation declaring a customary adoption or 
marriage to be valid in no way oblige individuals to resort to such an adoption or 
such a marriage.58 Statutes and courts accommodate the right of individuals to 
 
53. Boyd, supra note 52. 
54. See Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Can.). 
55. See GRAMMOND, supra note 13. 
56. In 2011, 1.8 million individuals reported that they had at least one indigenous ancestor.  
That is about four percent of the total population of Canada. See Population and Geographic  
Distribution, STAT. CAN., http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-645-x/2015001/pop-concept-eng.htm 
[ https://perma.cc/945H-Y2ZD] ( last updated Dec. 24, 2015). 
57. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, art. VI, § 91(24) (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
app II, no 5 (Can.). 
58. For a study of the founding cases regarding recognition of customary adoptions and 
marriages in northern territories, see Norman K. Zlotkin, Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal Customary 
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choose the customary regime but do not deny them access to the state regime if that 
is what they prefer. 
The potential for choice of law in indigenous governance has been reinforced 
by the implementation of aboriginal and treaty rights recognized in Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Aboriginal and treaty rights are group rights that relate to 
land and resources but can also extend to personal law matters, such as adoption or 
marriage.59 Because they belong to the indigenous group and not to the individuals 
within it, it is up to the group to set the terms and conditions under which its 
members may exercise them.60 Section 35 rights are, in other words, communally 
self-regulated. Where personal law matters are concerned, the individual exercise of 
aboriginal rights is governed by the rules of the group according to the principle of 
the personality of laws, since only individuals who can establish a personal 
connection to the group can avail themselves of the group right.61 The same will be 
true of the general aboriginal right to self-government if such a right is one day 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada.62 Self-governing authority would 
apply to a range of matters relating to the internal life of the community,63 but with 
respect to personal law, would extend only to individuals who are members of the 
group or otherwise significantly connected to it. 
Individuals, however, are not a priori legally compelled to avail themselves of 
an aboriginal right held by their community. State law remains at their disposal, even 
in situations dealt with under such a right. The mere fact that a community has an 
aboriginal right in relation to marriage, for example, does not require an indigenous 
couple to marry under the community regime arising from the aboriginal right 
instead of under the general law of the state. The application of the general law to 
a couple that has chosen to submit to it does not in itself constitute a violation of 
the aboriginal right, since the couple is establishing its legal relationship outside that 
right. The couple is not acting as indigenous beneficiaries of an aboriginal right, but 
as Canadian citizens claiming a general right. 
 
Law in Canada: Selected Marriage and Adoption Cases, 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (1984). Statutes currently 
recognizing customary adoptions in Canada are the following: Aboriginal Custom Adoption 
Recognition Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c 26 (Can.); Child and Family Services Act, S.Y. 2008, c. 1 s. 138 
(Can.); Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 5, s. 46; Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 2 (Can.); An Act to 
Amend the Civil Code and Other Legislative Provisions as Regards Adoption and the Disclosure of 
Information, S.Q. 2017, c 12, arts 1–13 (Can.). 
59. See Casimel v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 1994 2 C.N.L.R. 22 (B.C.C.A.) 
at para. 18 (Can.). 
60. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 115 (Can.); R v. Sappier;  
R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686, para. 26 (Can.). 
61. See Ghislain Otis, L’Autonomie Personnelle au Cœur des Droits Ancestraux: Sub Qua Lege 
Vivis?, 52 MCGILL L.J. 657 (2007). 
62. Aboriginal parties have claimed an aboriginal right to self-government in several court cases, 
but the Supreme Court has so far declined to rule on the matter. See Pamajewon v. The Queen, [1996] 
2 S.C.R. 821, para. 24; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 170–171. 
63. See Kent McNeil, Judicial Approaches to Self-Government Since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal 
Coherence, in LET RIGHT BE DONE 129, 143–50 (Hamar Foster et al. eds., 2007). 
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Like aboriginal rights, rights that arise from historical treaties belong to the 
collective,64 and their individual exercise, according to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, is “by authority of the local community.”65 Members of treaty signatory 
peoples may therefore exercise only treaty rights that are derived from the group66 
and in compliance with written or unwritten standards implemented by the group. 
These individuals are not required to act under the treaty, however, and may opt for 
state law, even though there are community standards that have been recognized by 
the treaty. For example, an individual may wish to hunt under the state’s statutory 
sports hunting regime instead of the indigenous regime under the treaty. The 
application of the general law to indigenous individuals who do not wish to invoke 
the treaty but instead seek a privilege granted under state law is not in itself a 
violation of the treaty. 
Choice of law is also an important characteristic of the new governance 
structures established by recent agreements characterized as “modern treaties,”67 
which several indigenous nations have successfully negotiated to settle both their 
land and self-government claims.68 Under these agreements, which are 
constitutionally protected pursuant to Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, newly 
created indigenous governments hold a range of legislative powers, some of which 
 
64. See in particular R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, para. 36 (Can.). 
65. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, para. 17 (Can.). 
66. However, discrete individual interests derived from such a collective right may ground 
individual legal claims. See Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227, para. 32–35 (Can.). 
67. The term “modern” is used to distinguish treaties signed since the 1970s, after the 
government of Canada resumed treaty-making, from “historic” treaties negotiated between contact and 
the early 1900s. 
68. See Nisga’a Final Agreement, B.C.-Can.-Nisga’a, May 27, 1998, S.C. 200, ch. 7,  
http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/nis-eng.pdf [ https://perma.cc/862G-RGCF] (entered into force 
May 11, 2000) [ hereinafter Nisga’a Agreement]; Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement among 
the Tlicho and the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada,  
Can.-Tlicho, Aug. 22, 1921, S.C. 2005, ch. 1, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1292948193972/
1292948598544 [ https://perma.cc/5BMF-WUWJ] (entered into force Aug. 4, 2005) [ hereinafter 
Tlicho Agreement]; Land Claims Agreement Between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,  
Can.-Inuit, S.C. 2005, ch. 27, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1293647179208/1293647660333 
[ https://perma.cc/Z5B7-CGU9] (entered into force Dec. 1, 2005) [ hereinafter Labrador Inuit 
Agreement]; Yale First Nation Final Agreement, B.C.-Can.-Yale First Nation, S.C. 2013, ch. 25,  
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1336657835560/1336658472497 [ https://perma.cc/UDL3-
32SC] ( last updated May 10, 2012) [ hereinafter Yale Agreement]; Maa-nulth First Nations Final 
Agreement, B.C.-Can.-Maa-nulth, Apr. 9, 2009, S.C. 2009, ch. 18, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/
eng/1100100022581/1100100022591 [ https://perma.cc/7GGR-R7AG] (entered into force  
Apr. 1, 2011) [ hereinafter Maa-nulth Agreement]; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement,  
B.C.-Can.-Tsawwassen, Dec. 6, 2007, S.C. 2008, ch. 32, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/
1100100022706/1100100022717 [ https://perma.cc/K2LN-9MV3] (entered into force Apr. 3, 2009) 
[ hereinafter Tsawwassen Agreement]; Lheidli T’enneh Final Agreement: Lheidli T’enneh Lands,  
B.C.-Can.-Lheidli T’enneh, Oct. 29, 2006, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100022555/
1100100022557 [ https://perma.cc/P3HL-PES4] ( last updated Sept. 15, 2010) [ hereinafter  
Lheidli T’enneh Agreement]; Tla’amin Final Agreement, B.C.-Can.-Tla’amin, Apr. 11, 2014,  
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1397152724601/1397152939293 [ https://perma.cc/AK7A-
JHXA] ( last updated July 13, 2017) [ hereinafter Tla’amin Agreement]. 
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are territorial while others are personal.69 Personal law matters that are within 
indigenous jurisdiction include marriage,70 family assets,71 guardianship and 
tutorship,72 adoption,73 child protection,74 legal capacity,75 and successions.76 
At this point, it should be noted that indigenous laws enacted on the basis of 
a treaty do not automatically extinguish indigenous law that might be observed 
outside the treaty or other institutional arrangements within state law. For example, 
the Nisga’a treaty takes notice of Nisga’a traditional laws and specifies that they are 
not included in the definition of “law” for the purpose of the treaty.77 This 
acknowledgment that traditional laws continue to exist alongside the treaty leaves 
their reconciliation with official law to informal processes. Even if a treaty 
purported to abrogate non-state indigenous law, such a proclamation would not in 
itself suffice to eradicate the “living law” of the group, that is, the norms and 
processes governing the community, at least partially, in actual practice. 
Accordingly, it is conceivable that situations will arise where unrecognized 
customary or traditional law will occupy the same field as both official indigenous 
treaty law and state law. Individual choice between unrecognized living law and 
official indigenous or state law may therefore take place even if the choice of 
unrecognized law is not enforceable either by treaty-created indigenous institutions 
or by the state. 
The issue that treaties can effectively regulate and enforce, however, is whether 
individuals may choose between indigenous law enacted or recognized pursuant to 
a treaty78 and state law. A close reading of the treaties reveals that, indeed, both 
 
69. Non-territorial indigenous authority under modern treaties is not restricted to personal law. 
It extends to cultural and social affairs and even, in some cases, to resource management and harvesting. 
For an overview of indigenous, non-territorial powers, see Geneviève Motard, Le Principe de 
Personnalité des Lois Comme Voie d’Émancipation des Peuples Autochtones? 205–17 (2013) 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Laval University) (on file with Laval University). 
70. Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.17.1; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 
68, at ch. 17, § 93; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, §§ 3.21.1–3.21.2; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, 
at ch. 15, §§ 121–122. In the Nisga’a Agreement, the indigenous legislative power with respect to 
marriage is territorial. See Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 11, §§ 75–76. 
71. Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.18.2. 
72. Id. § 17.18.6. 
73. Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.18.9; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, 
at ch. 16, § 56; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 7.4.4(i); Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 11, 
§ 96; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 13.15.3; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at  
ch. 17, § 53; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.14.2; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 15, § 62. 
74. Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.15.5; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note  
68, at ch. 16, § 69; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 13.16.2; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement,  
supra note 68, at ch. 17, § 63; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.16.1; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, 
§ 7.4.4(g). 
75. Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 7.4.4(h). 
76. Id. § 7.4.4(l); Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 14, § 2; Nisga’a Agreement, supra 
note 68, at ch. 11, § 116; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.23.1. 
77. See Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 1 (“Definitions”). 
78. Customary law may be recognized by a treaty. See, e.g., Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 
68, § 17.3.4(e) (stating that the Inuit Constitution may provide for “the recognition of Inuit customary 
First to Printer_Otis (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
220 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:207 
choice of personal status and choice of personal law are recognized by modern 
treaties 
An individual’s eligibility to be enrolled as a “participant” or member of the 
indigenous nation party to a treaty is subject to detailed rules and conditions.79 Once 
enrolled under the treaty, an individual can apply to have his or her name removed 
from the enrollment register, and the enrollment authority must remove the name 
of the applicant from the nation’s register.80 Apart from the application formality, 
no restriction or condition is imposed regarding the individual’s choice to relinquish 
his or her status as a treaty participant, and the indigenous authority has no 
discretion to deny disenrollment. An individual’s right to exit may not be overridden 
by indigenous law and thus is firmly entrenched in the treaties. Nothing in the 
treaties prevents an eligible individual from applying later for re-enrollment. 
Of course, the legal consequences of waiving indigenous status altogether are 
far-reaching because doing so amounts to foregoing all the advantages and rights 
flowing from the treaty. Leaving will therefore be considered only in the most 
pressing situations. Ultimately, however, individuals are empowered to weigh the 
merits and drawbacks of their indigenous status and, if they so desire, opt for the 
status of mere Canadian citizen governed by the general law. 
As for choice of law, the possibility for individuals within the reach of 
indigenous personal law to choose to be governed by state law instead is not so 
clearly affirmed in the treaties, but it does flow from a general provision found in 
every treaty stating that indigenous individuals holding treaty rights still retain the 
rights and benefits available to all Canadian citizens. For example, Section 2.2.4 of 
the Tlicho Agreement provides that “[n]othing in the Agreement shall affect the rights 
of Tåîchô Citizens as Canadian citizens and they shall continue to be entitled to all 
the rights and benefits of all other Canadian citizens applicable to them from time 
to time.” Section 2.8.1 of the Labrador Inuit Agreement more briefly declares that 
“[n]othing in the Agreement affects the rights of Inuit as Canadian citizens.”81 
The purpose of such clauses is quite clearly to ensure that indigenous persons 
will not be denied access to rights, programs, and benefits made available to all 
citizens by non-indigenous governments simply because they are treaty 
 
law and the application of Inuit customary law to Inuit with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction 
and authority of the Nunatsiavut Government . . . .”). 
79. Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 20; Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, at  
ch. 3; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 3; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 21; Yale 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 25; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 26; Lheidli T’enneh 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 3; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 22. 
80. Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 20, § 17; Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, 
§ 3.8.1; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.4.2; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 21, § 6; 
Yale Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 25, § 5.9; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 26.5.1; Lheidli 
T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 3, § 18; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 22, § 20. 
81. All the self-government agreements contain such a clause. See Maa-nulth Agreement, supra 
note 68, § 1.1; Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 15; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.2.4; 
Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 35; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at  
ch. 3, § 29; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.9.1; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 33. 
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beneficiaries. A broad range of general laws offers rights and benefits to citizens, 
including legislation pertaining to personal law. Therefore, an indigenous citizen 
whose community has legislative authority in the area of personal law under a treaty 
should in principle still be able to benefit from the state’s general law in the same 
area like other Canadian citizens. This is confirmed by a standard clause in treaties 
providing that federal and provincial laws apply to indigenous persons subject to 
the treaty,82 and by the fact that, under the treaties, state and indigenous laws dealing 
with the same subject-matter both apply as long as they do not conflict.83 
In this way, the treaties implement a regime of jurisdictional overlap that 
allows both indigenous treaty authorities and the state to exercise jurisdiction over 
the same act and the same actor. Individuals are enabled to navigate these normative 
orders by opting, for example, to marry in accordance with the general law and not 
pursuant to an indigenous marriage law enacted under the treaty. Because both 
indigenous and non-indigenous law are valid under the treaty, once they have opted 
and complied with the law of their choice, couples are legally married and therefore 
do not need to marry again under the other law 
Unlike the right to exit, however, this general rule of choice is not absolute, 
since the treaties do explicitly allow indigenous laws to displace the general state law 
in specific situations. This typically happens when indigenous law is given 
paramountcy in the event of a conflict with state law, thus rendering state law 
inoperative to the extent of the conflict. According to the treaties, indigenous 
personal law generally prevails when a conflict of laws arises.84 The treaties specify 
that laws conflict when there is an “actual conflict in operation,”85 which is one of 
 
82. Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.15.1; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68,  
§ 1.5.1; Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 13; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, §§ 2.8.2, 7.7.1; 
Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 19; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at  
ch. 2, § 19; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.5.1; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 13. 
83. Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 52(b); Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 
68, § 2.23.1. The other treaties apply the same rule as a result of their conflict rules, which allow both 
state and indigenous laws to apply in the absence of an operational conflict. 
84. Indigenous laws are paramount in relation to adoption. See Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra 
note 68, § 17.18.14; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 13.15.3; Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, 
at ch. 11, § 99; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 16, § 63; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra 
note 68, at ch. 17, § 58; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.14.8; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at 
ch. 15, § 68. Indigenous laws are also paramount in relation to the celebration of marriage. See Yale 
Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.21.9. They are paramount in relation to successions. See Nisga’a 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 11, § 116; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 14, § 3; Yale 
Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.23.2. Finally, indigenous laws are paramount in relation to the effects of 
marriage or family relationships. See Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.18.14. Indigenous 
laws regarding child protection generally prevail over provincial laws. Accord Maa-nulth Agreement, 
supra note 68, § 13.16.7; Tsawwassen Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 16, § 74; Lheidli T’enneh 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 17, § 68; Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.16.5. However, there is an 
exception. See Labrador Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 17.15.7. 
85. This is the definition of “conflict” found in chapter 1 of the Labrador Inuit Agreement, 
Tla’amin Agreement, and Lheidli T’enneh Agreement. As for the Maa-nulth Agreement, Yale Agreement, and 
the Tsawwassen Agreement, they define a “conflict” as an “actual conflict in operation or operational 
incompatibility.” 
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the tests applied by the Supreme Court to decide whether a conflict exists between 
a federal and a provincial law. According to this test, an operational conflict occurs 
when compliance with one law would violate the other law.86 It is submitted that 
these rules allow indigenous governments to enact legislation explicitly making 
indigenous law the sole law applicable to indigenous individuals in the area of 
personal law. If such legislation came into force, state authorities would necessarily 
breach it if they applied the general law to indigenous individuals governed by the 
treaty. An indigenous statute barring individual choice of law would thus generate 
an operational conflict making state law inoperative.87 
This power of indigenous communities to determine the issue of choice of law 
requires that they reflect on the impact that a systematic competition with non-
indigenous law can have on the vitality of the indigenous legal order. Individual 
freedom to choose the applicable law, if exercised by a substantial number of 
community members, could have collective and institutional consequences. The 
individual, whose decision could either reinforce or weaken the indigenous legal 
system in the face of the state’s historically dominant position, becomes the ultimate 
judge of how authority and legitimacy are distributed among competing 
governments.88 Ruling out individual strategic and possibly opportunistic choices 
would make it possible to assert indigenous autonomy, strengthen the foundations 
of new institutions, and promote the emergence of a new indigenous legal order. 
There may be other good reasons to override choice of law. The exclusive 
application of indigenous law would avert the well-known pitfalls of choice such as 
the difficulty of ensuring that it is free and informed, the unforeseeability of 
personal law situations when individuals are permitted to “behave like perfect 
consumers of the law,”89 and opportunistic temptations that have the potential to 
 
86. The Supreme Court of Canada has written that an operational conflict exists “where one 
enactment says ‘yes’ and the other says ‘no’, such that ‘compliance with one is defiance of the other.’” 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, para. 64, 
(citing Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at 191). Likewise, article 2.52(a) of the 
Nisga’a Agreement states that “there is a conflict between laws if compliance with one law would be a 
breach of the other law.” Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 52(a). 
87. As Aldridge puts it with respect to the Nisga’a Agreement, “if the federal law says it applies 
and the Nisga’a law says it does not apply, then that is inconsistency and the Nisga’a win.” See Jim 
Aldridge, The Nisga’a Treaty: Reflections after the First Ten Years, in FÉDÉRALISME ET GOUVERNANCE 
AUTOCHTONE (FEDERALISM AND ABORIGINAL GOVERNANCE) 159, 164 (Ghislain Otis & Martin 
Papillon eds., 2013). 
88. Glenn has shown that the vitality, and even the survival, over time of a legal tradition 
primarily depends on its capacity to retain its adherents in the face of the expansionism of competing 
traditions. This capacity is maintained not through coercive means but through persuasive arguments. 
See GLENN, supra note 36, at 40–42. 
89. Régis Lafargue, Les Contraintes Posées par l’Article 75 de la Constitution: Entre Héritage 
Colonial et Volonté de Modernisation de la Société Mahoraise, in MAYOTTE DANS LA RÉPUBLIQUE 305, 
330 (Laurent Sermet & Jean Coudray eds., 2004). 
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degenerate into abuse when individual choices are made to the detriment of the 
legitimate interests of others.90 
But should choice nonetheless be maintained for the sake of enabling 
individuals to find refuge in the state law to avert human rights abuse at the hands 
of indigenous power? 
The defense of individual choice of law as a preventive human rights remedy 
is compelling when the self-regulating group, for reasons pertaining to its religion 
or culture among other things, is not expected and does not wish to comply with 
the standards of protection of individual rights and freedoms imposed on state 
powers in Western democracies. This argument loses much of it persuasive force 
with respect to modern treaties in Canada, which affirm a strong indigenous 
commitment to human rights. 
The treaties explicitly make indigenous governments and law-making 
authorities subject to the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,91 
which guarantees fundamental freedoms as well as the rights of all to life, security, 
and equality.92 As a result, legal remedies are available to any person whose rights 
or freedoms have been infringed by indigenous authorities in the exercise of their 
power under the treaty.93 Certain indigenous constitutions also contain charters of 
rights setting out the need to consider the indigenous context, but also reiterating 
the imperative to protect individuals against the power of the group.94 In addition, 
Subsection 35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that notwithstanding any other 
 
90. The need to check abusive choice of law—that is, choice intended to disadvantage or harm 
bona fide third parties—is acknowledged in countries that apply personal status pluralism. See 
GANNAGÉ, supra note 18, at 202. 
91. Inuit Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.18.1; Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 1.3.2; 
Nisga’a Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 9; Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.15.1; Tsawwassen 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 9; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 9; Yale 
Agreement, supra note 68, § 2.3.2; Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 2, § 8. 
92. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, § 7 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
93. Subsection 24(1) of the Charter provides that “[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as 
guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction 
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” 
94. THE NUNATSIAVUT CONSTITUTION ACT [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 1, 2005, § 2.1.3,  
http://www.nunatsiavut.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IL%202005-02%20-%20E.pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/NJ75-RPDN]; Yale First Nation Final Agreement Act, B.C.-Can.-Yale First 
Nation, SBC 2011, § 2.1, http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/11011_01 
[ https://perma.cc/2WT4-9G3K] (assented to June 2, 2011). The following constitutions do  
not contain charters, but still provide for the protection of certain individual rights:  
TSAWWASSEN FIRST NATION CONSTITUTION ACT [CONSTITUTION], Feb. 3, 2009, § 4.1,  
http://www.tsawwassenfirstnation.com/pdfs/TFN-Laws-Regulations-Policies/Constitution/
Constitution_Act_06.15.pdf [ https://perma.cc/52NP-LVTW]; HUU-AY-AHT FIRST NATIONS 
CONSTITUTION, Apr. 28, 2007, § 1.4, http://www.maanulth.ca/downloads/Constitution_ 
Huu-ay-aht.pdf [ https://perma.cc/BNV2-RJ4D]; Ka:’yu:’k’t’h/Che:k’tles7et’h’ First Nations Final 
Agreement, July 24, 2008, § 1.4, http://www.maanulth.ca/downloads/treaty/2010_maa-nulth_ 
final_agreement_english.pdf [ https://perma.cc/DE4E-E3EX]; TOQUAHT NATION CONSTITUTION, 
May 14, 2007, § 1.3, http://www.maanulth.ca/downloads/Constitution_Toquaht_Nation.pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/HV3K-W4XU]. 
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provision of the Act, “the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection  
(1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons,”95 thus ensuring that women 
and men benefit equally from indigenous law enacted or applied pursuant to a 
treaty. Indigenous peoples no doubt expect Canadian Charter rights and freedoms 
to be interpreted and applied in a culturally sensitive manner, as is arguably 
mandated by the Canadian Charter itself,96 so as to accommodate indigenous 
difference.97 But individuals are nonetheless legally entitled to challenge the abuse 
of indigenous collective power in a meaningful way, and existing data shows that 
they are prepared to seek redress from their governments to vindicate their 
individual rights or freedoms.98 
The exercise of indigenous powers relating to personal law is further 
circumscribed by the treaties through directive principles and legal standards 
designed to safeguard the interests of vulnerable individuals. For example, 
indigenous legislation on adoption, guardianship, and tutorship must affirm and 
respect the primacy of the best interests of the child.99 In addition, indigenous law 
must in several areas be aligned with requirements protecting vulnerable individuals 
laid down in provincial or federal statutes,100 thereby resulting in the harmonization 
of indigenous and non-indigenous laws. 
 
95. See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
96. Section 25 of the Charter provides that “[t]he guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights 
or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada . . . .” Some commentators take the view 
that section 25 mandates that Charter rights and freedoms should be construed in a culturally sensitive 
way so as not to unjustifiably undermine indigenous distinctive philosophies and traditions. For a useful 
review of section 25, see GRAMMOND, supra note 13, at 428–38. 
97. For an exhaustive study of the culturally sensitive application of the Charter to indigenous 
systems of justice, see DAVID L. MILWARD, ABORIGINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHARTER: REALIZING A 
CULTURALLY SENSITIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS (W. Wesley Pue ed., 2012). 
98. See Ghislain Otis, Aboriginal Governance with or Without the Canadian Charter?, in 
ABORIGINALITY AND GOVERNANCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE FROM QUEBEC 265 
(Gordon Christie ed., 2006). 
 99. Most treaties also require that an indigenous law on child protection expressly provide that 
it “will be interpreted and administered such that the Safety and Well-Being of Children are the 
paramount considerations.” See Maa-nulth Agreement, supra note 68, § 13.16.3; Tsawwassen 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 16, § 70; Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 7, § 64; Yale 
Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.16.2(a); Tlicho Agreement, supra note 68, § 7.4.4(g); Tla’amin Agreement, 
supra note 68, at ch. 15, § 74(a). 
100. See, e.g., Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.14.3(b) (providing that indigenous adoption 
laws shall “require the consent of individuals whose consent to a Child’s adoption is required under 
Provincial Law, subject to the power of the court to dispense with such consent under Provincial 
Law.”). See also Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 15, § 63(b). The Lheidli T’enneh Agreement 
requires that indigenous laws regarding adoption and child protection establish standards comparable 
to standards set out under Provincial Law. See Lheidli T’enneh Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 17,  
§§ 54(b), 64(b); Tla’amin Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 15, § 74(b). According to section 17.18.3 of 
the Labrador Inuit Agreement, Inuit laws on support, marital property, or family or domestic affairs 
“must accord rights to and provide for the protection of spouses, cohabiting partners, children, parents, 
vulnerable family members and individuals defined as dependents under Inuit Laws that are comparable 
to the rights and protections enjoyed by similarly situated individuals under Laws of General 
Application.” Some treaties subject marriages under indigenous law to provincial rules or requirements 
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Given the unqualified right to exit protected by the treaties and considering 
the foregoing human rights guarantees enshrined in the treaties, the argument that 
choice of law should be a feature of treaty governance to protect individuals from 
group oppression appears to be fatally undermined. The option to turn to state law 
would not afford an indigenous individual a decisive human rights advantage and, 
in fact, experience shows that state law may itself be in breach of Canadian Charter 
rights and freedoms. On the other hand, maintaining choice of law would create 
systemic competition between indigenous and state law to the potential detriment 
of indigenous law given the imbedded power dynamics. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights, modern treaties have 
added a new layer of complexity to legal pluralism in Canada. They lay down a 
principle of individual choice of law, but this principle can in most cases be reversed 
by explicit indigenous legislation with respect to personal law matters such as 
marriage, adoption, or successions. No modern treaty indigenous government has 
yet legislated on choice of law or even made any substantial use of its legislative 
authority with respect to personal law. When such legislation is enacted, making 
indigenous law exclusive will strengthen the legal systems of fledgling authorities 
put in place to further self-government and correct now-discredited colonial 
policies. Other considerations may nevertheless favour a choice model. 
Individual choice of law is one possible way of reconciling legal pluralism with 
individual freedom and human rights, although making it work in practice is 
admittedly a challenge, given the sociological forces that often impede individual 
autonomy. Formally placing the state and indigenous legal orders into competition 
with each other could be an alternative to aligning indigenous law with the state’s 
human rights instruments. But indigenous governmental action based on modern 
treaties is subject to the Canadian Charter and also, in some cases, to indigenous 
charters of rights.101 Therefore, the argument in favor of choice 
based on human rights loses its force because indigenous individuals governed 
by these treaties are in no way delivered defenseless to community powers. 
Yet it may be that many indigenous individuals value the notion that, in 
addition to their status and rights as members of treaty indigenous nations, they can 
still enjoy all the rights and privileges of Canadian citizens. Accordingly, regardless 
of human rights considerations, indigenous communities might be reluctant to deny 
 
so that marriage licenses may be issued by indigenous authorities only if such authorities have been 
appointed as an issuer of marriage licenses under provincial law and the issuance of the marriage license 
complies with the provincial marriage act. See Yale Agreement, supra note 68, § 3.21.4; Tla’amin 
Agreement, supra note 68, at ch. 15, § 124. 
101. For example, chapter 2 of the Labrador Inuit Constitution contains the Labrador Inuit 
Charter of Rights and Responsibilities, which applies to Labrador Inuit governmental institutions.  
See THE NUNATSIAVUT CONSTITUTION ACT [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 1, 2005, sched. 1-A,  
http://www.nunatsiavut.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IL%202005-02%20-%20E.pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/NJ75-RPDN]. 
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their members access to state law in the area of personal law. In that case, they 
should consider regulating choice, at least in terms of procedure and form, to ensure 
that it is free and informed and to guarantee a fair competition between indigenous 
and non-indigenous law within the framework of Canadian state legal pluralism. 
 
 
